At
bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1)
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony Uy and James
Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of
the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Cebu
City
in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1)
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA
alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’
ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2)
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304,
appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias
‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY
alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3)
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was
a minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304,
he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor
in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4)
Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00
as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three
(3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless,
they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and
the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In
accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25
of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible
exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.
SO
ORDERED.”
Appellants
anchor their motions on the following grounds:
A. LARRAÑAGA
“I
THE
COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAÑAGA AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;
II
THE
POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;
III
LARRAÑAGA
SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;
IV
THE
TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE;
V
THE
CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY; AND
VI
PROSECUTION
WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS.”[1]
B. AZNAR
“I
THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS;
AND (B) CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF RUSIA.
III
THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.
IV
THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS.”[2]
C. ADLAWAN,
BALANSAG, CAÑO
“I
PROSECUTION
WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND
(E), SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
II
RUSIA’S
TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE,
INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.
III
BIAS
AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO
WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
IV
THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”[3]
D. JAMES
ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY
“I
ACCUSED
JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR
AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE
IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST
JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;”[4]
In
his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larrañaga
submitted a separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic
Pathologist, to show that the examination conducted by the prosecution expert
witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is
inadequate.
In
a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration[5],
Aznar submitted to this Court the Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty.
Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this
case was flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his
involvement in this case but because he had in his possession a pack of shabu
and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.
On
July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment[6]
praying that the four (4) motions for reconsideration be denied with finality,
there being no new argument raised. He responded to appellants’
assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged
Decision.
In
his consolidated comment[7]
to Aznar’s supplemental motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General
enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarin’s Affidavit should not be given
consideration. On February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the
Solicitor General “read out of context” certain portions of the Affidavit.
He argued that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that,
at the time of his arrest, there was no evidence against him. On March 4,
2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating that Aznar’s reply
“actually supports the undersigned counsel’s (Solicitor General’s)
position that Atty. Villarin’s Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his
innocence or at least even acquit them on reasonable doubt,” thus, “it
would be useless to call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit.”
On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit
should be given due consideration.
Except
for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James
Andrew’s alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At
the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again
on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the
issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our
Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership
vs. Velasco,[8]
we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual
invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in
the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
movant."
The
foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larrañaga,
Aznar, Adlawan, Caño and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised
therein are not neoteric matters demanding new judicial determination.
They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their respective briefs
which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the
Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However,
in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it
necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.
The
following is a précis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:
This
Court erred –
first,
in according credence to Rusia’s testimony;
second,
in rejecting appellants’ alibi;
third,
in holding that
the trial court did not violate their right
to due process when it excluded the testimony of other defense
witnesses; and
fourth,
in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.
In
deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the
case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented
by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general
conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal
of a criminal case opens its entire records for review.[9]
I
Appellants
vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusia’s testimony hook,
line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However,
it must be stressed that Rusia’s testimony was not viewed in isolation.
In giving credence to Rusia’s testimony, the trial court took into
consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies
of other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not
uphold the trial court’s findings.
We
reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia’s
testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with the physical
evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.[10]
The presence of Marijoy’s ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan,
Carcar with tape on her mouth
and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered
Rusia’s testimony on what actually took place from
Ayala
Center
to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial
court are of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the
commission of the crimes could furnish.
(First
of all, Rusia's
testimony as far as tape on her month, did not concur with the testimony of SPO4 Arturo Unabia, the
Officer-in-Charge of the Carcar Police Station and the first ones to inspect
the body, when he said the tape was in the eyes, forehead and neck. We quote
per TSN 9/17/98 pages 10 and 11:
COURT: Q What about her eyes?
A They were slightly covered by the masking tape.
Q But not completely covered?
A The eyes were almost covered, only the lower portion
were seen and there so
many flies.
Q But her lips were completely covered with tape?
A Only these. (Witness pointing to his eyes, forehead
and also his neck)
Q But her lips were not covered with tape?
A So, Your Honor, but there were also flies in her
mouth.
To view picture 
. Second, bolstered,
how? If Rusia would have pointed to the other missing sister's body, then we can
safely say he knew what he was talking about. What Rusia testified is what we
all knew already. Why didn't he make it a point to find out where the other
sister was. Contrary to normal behavior, Rusia testified he saw Adlawan about
five (5) days after the incident and did not have the chance to ask where the
other girl was?
The
details of what he supplied to the court was well known to everyone in Cebu
even before Rusia was arrested some many months after. The police already had
"produced" affidavits from so called witnesses as early as September
of 1997, or 8 months before Rusia was arrested.. All Rusia had to do was to memorize these details.
Reinforcing his testimony is its
corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he
narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed
Jacqueline’s two failed attempts to escape from appellants near
Ayala
Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as
the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on
the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when
he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the white van, driven
by Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of
“quarreling male and female“ emanating from the van. And
lastly,
Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larrañaga
and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All
these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia’s narration.
Now, with such strong anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies
of disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusia’s
testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone
might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his character,
it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the
prosecution.
(Rolando
Dacillo is a police asset of Roy Codiñera, the police officer who
"convinced" Rusia to turn state witness. In the Philippines, a
police asset is beholden to his handler. One can only wonder, how many more
police assets were used as prosecution witnesses. To view article .
Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza:
It
was never explained in court why appellants will hire another van and invite two (2)
total strangers, the driver and the conductor, to witness a crime they were
about to commit when they already had two (2) cars when them. And why go all
the way to Carcar, when they already had a "safehouse" in the city
where the witness had claimed they raped the girls earlier.
Alfredo
Duarte just happened to get hungry at 1:30 in the morning and decided to walk
about 50 meters from his house to buy barbecue and baby's milk and by stroke
of luck for the prosecution, he bought barbecue in
the same time and place as the suspects bought barbecue and and bought baby's
milk in the same time and store the suspects bought wine. Besides, how
can he hear female voices when the star witness testified that their mouths
were taped? Coincidence, or just another police asset?
Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio,
more dubious witnesses.
How can they see, recognize and remember
their faces when they were negotiating a curve and were going uphill. The
lights of their motorcycles would have been over their heads of the appellants.
Also, had the
Regional Trial Court judge allowed the weathermen to testify, they would have
created doubts on most of the affidavits of these so-called government
witnesses. They would have testified that Cebu was experiencing heavy rains
during that night until early morning of the following day. However, outside
of Mrs. Chiong and the security guard of Ayala Center not one of these
passing-by witnesses ever mentioned nor testified in court about any rains. In fact, the
policeman asset, Dacillo, casually walked to and from Ayala Center and his
house with his wife to watch a movie. Rosendo Rio, in spite of the heavy
rains, still decided to get up early and deliver shoes to another
town.)
II
Appellants
likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial court’s
rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the
defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters.[11]
Being evidence that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain
more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on
clear and positive evidence.[12]
On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a
defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the
accused.[13]
(What about the parents
of these young witnesses who stood by and are still standing by their
children's eye-witness accounts? Surely these parents wouldn't allow their
children to perjure themselves to save a rapist-murder.
Some of these parents doesn't even know Paco from Adam.)
This case
presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants’
alibi supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or
classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of the
herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way,
related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain
that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
(Yes,
but what about the witness protection program. Weren't they compensated for their
testimonies? What about Rusia and the favors he was receiving from the Chiongs
as admitted by Mr. Chiong in a recent newspaper article. To view )
Besides,
a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the
appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the
requirements of time and place.[14]
They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the
Ayala
Center
, Cebu City
when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that
Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within
the vicinity of
Cebu
City
on July 16, 1997.
Not
even Larrañaga who claimed to be in
Quezon City
satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. (What
about Paco's 35 witnesses? Don't they count? More on this )
During the hearing, it
was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from
Manila
to Cebu
and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route.
(It
is physically impossible to travel between Manila to Cebu in one (1) hour.
Everyone knows that. One
is required to be at the airport at least 45 minute before departure. What
about the travel time between Loyola Heights in Quezon City to the airport in
Parañague; that will take about an hour, depending on the traffic. To this,
you will have to add the travel time from the Cebu airport to Ayala Center.
Over all, and considering one has no check-in luggage to claim in Cebu, the
least time needed to travel between Quezon City to Cebu is three hours, and
that is assuming the plane is on time.)
One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from
Manila
to
Cebu
each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in
Cebu
City
on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality.
Four (4) witnesses identified Larrañaga as one of the two men talking to
Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified
that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga
approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of
Ayala
Center. The incident reminded her of Jacqueline’s prior
story that he was Marijoy’s admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows Larrañaga
since she had seen him on five (5) occasions.
(Knows
Larrañaga? If so, why did she ask Jacqueline who is he when they both saw
Paco together for the first time? Besides, Sheila Singson never mentioned seeing Paco
Larrañaga being in Ayala Center when she was earlier investigated by the
National Bureau of Investigation. What convinced her to change her story?)
Analie Konahap also
testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00
o’clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West
Entry of
Ayala
Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larrañaga and Josman,
having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her
office at the third level of
Ayala
Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala
Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo
Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at
Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The
latter was leaning against the hood of a white van.[15]
And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larrañaga as one of
the participes criminis.
Taking
the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of
Rusia, we are convinced that Larrañaga was indeed in
Cebu
City
at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal
perpetrators thereof.
At
this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that
Larrañaga was charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young
female students in
Cebu
. Months before the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the
parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larrañaga’s
attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda
Civic. It happened just near the gate of Rochelle’s
school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a
portion of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998,
thus:
“ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a …. Inspector Era handed to this representation
a copy of a
Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office,
University of San Carlos, P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is
signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho,
Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High School, and for the record, I
will read the content:
TO
WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high school
student of your
University
of
San Carlos-Girls High School
, are writing your good office about an untoward incident involving our
daughter and another student of your school.
x
x x
x
x x
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates, Michelle
Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a ride home near the
school campus, a black Honda Civic with five young male teenagers including
the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and simultaneously one of them,
which was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of
your school, grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their
vehicle. She resisted and got away from him. Sensing some people were watching
what they were doing, they hurriedly sped away.
We are very
concerned about Rochelle’s safety. Still now, she is suffering the shock and
tension that she is not supposed to experience in her young life. It is very
hard for us parents to think about what she’d been through.”[16]
The
presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not
enhance Larrañaga’s chance of securing an acquittal.
First of all, I don't
believe one
alleged incident justifies the Supreme Court to conclude that Paco
Larrañaga, "pruriently assaulting young
female students in
Cebu." Besides,
this non-notarized "To whom it may
concern letter" should not even have been brought-up by the Supreme
Court unless the one who wrote the letter was presented in court to attest to
the veracity of this letter. Even the Regional Trial Court did not accept this
letter as the gospel truth:
TSN dated Sep. 23, 1998, page 45: COURT: "We are admitting the evidence even if it is hearsay, it is
admissible that there is such a letter. Not necessarily proving the truth of
the allegations there but proving that there was such a letter. Not
necessarily proving the truth of what is alleged there."
Besides, no action was taken by the school nor
the parties concerned against Paco. Even Mrs. Larrañaga wasn't called by the
school authorities. The police were never called to investigate. Not even Judge Ocampo cited this letter when he sentenced
Paco earlier. I don't even believe the prosecution cited this letter in
their briefs to either courts. Since the Supreme Court did not cite this
letter in their first decision, I wonder why they are bringing this up now.)
III
Larrañaga
and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial court’s exclusion of
Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director,
as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was properly
excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an
archaeologist.
And second, his report consists merely of the
results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months
old.
(Obviously
the Supreme Court did not bother reading all the pleadings of the
plaintives-appealants. If they did, they would have read that Bailen had a
team of experts with him when he examined the prosecution's evidences and one
of them was a fingerprint-expert, P/Lt. Col. REYNALDO D. MARCELO (RET). In
fact, he also had the following experts in his team; Prof.
Paz Abis, Dept, of Chemistry, Philippine College of Criminology; Mr. Erdolfu
Grimares, Ballistician and Crime Scene Reconstruction Expert, Philippine
College of Criminology, Anastacio Rosete Jr., Forensic Odontologist; Mr.
Victor Besa, Forensic Photographer and Benito
E. Molino, MD, Forensic Doctor.
Although,
the SC comments that Bailen's
report consists merely of the
results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months old might be true, Bailen and his team of experts brought up so many valid
observations worth looking in to. To view whole text of Bailen Report )
Anent Atty. Villarin’s failure to testify before the trial
court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via
his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing
to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in
said Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was the one
responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion.
The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his
intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor General’s
observation that such Affidavit “is neither helpful nor encouraging to
Aznar’s cause.” We quote his keen reflection on the matter:
“
x x x
x x x
Third.
Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof,
acknowledged that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy.
This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-appellant Aznar’s claim in
his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoy’s. Surely,
something is amiss in accused-appellant Aznar’s recollection of his defense.
Fourth.
Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph
24 of his affidavit that accused-appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect
in the subject crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this
Honorable Court’s findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.
Fifth.
In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, he stated that: ‘The
arrest of Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the
case because witnesses came out and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those
allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they disappeared.’
Hence, accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade
suspect in the Chiong sisters’ celebrated abduction and killing.
Sixth.
Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: ‘x
x x I did not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next
move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already placing him under surveillance
because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve
the crime x x x.’ Clearly, this statement is not an
indictment of the investigation that the police undertook in the subject
crimes.
Seventh.
Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged
influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the
purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and police officers who unearthed
the evidence against accused-appellants and successfully prosecuted the
latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin
would want to impress that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the
promotion.
(Again, the justices of
the Supreme Court failed to read that Villarin was retiring in a few months
time after completing 65 years old. In fact, one of
the prosecuting fiscals was appointed to his position after he retired. So how can they
claim that Villarin was aiming for a promotion. In the Philippines, the
mandatory age of retirement, especially for government officials is 65 years
old.)
Eighth.
Atty. Villarin’s inability to
testify in the criminal cases was not due solely to the prosecution’s
action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an argument openly discussed in
court. Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame
but the defense lawyers who did everything to make a mockery of the criminal
proceedings.
(How can the Supreme
Court conclude that the defense lawyers were making a mockery of the criminal
proceedings. Here we had lawyers trying their best to defend their clients in a
one-sided court, a court who wanted to pass judgment even before the first defense witness
even testified yet , who threatened and actually jailed some of
the lawyers, and who
suddenly disallowed the lawyers to present anymore witnesses , be
accused of making a mockery of the criminal proceedings.)
And
lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarin’s affidavit of the
quality of a “smoking gun” that would acquit accused-appellants of the
crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the police
investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and short of his
miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by the substance of his
affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is held on anything
that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own unsubstantiated
opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his
self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to
get a promotion when almost everyone else did.”[17]
(Again
it appears that the Supreme Court is evading the issue altogether. Instead of
commenting on the more pertinent issues in Atty. Villarin's statement like;
Why didn't Mrs. Chiong and Sheila
Singson ever mentioned to him, when they were questioned by the NBI a few days
after the girls went missing, that they knew Larrañaga and that Larrañaga
threatened her Marijoy a month earlier; why the police and the
prosecutors did not allow him to interview Rusia; and why the judge and the
prosecutor's blocked every move of the defense to make Villarin testify.
Instead, the SC
picked at length on Atty. Villarin's motive. To view full text of Villarin's
affidavit
)
Neither
can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortun’s separate study to show that
the examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate.
Such study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting
belated reception. Obviously, Larrañaga could have produced it during trial
had he wished to.
(The Supreme Court must
have forgotten that the RTC Judge all of a sudden stopped the defense lawyers
in presenting more witnesses. And this is why she was never presented. To view
the Fortun report ).
IV
Knowing
that the prosecution’s theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia’
testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it by
claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar
was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we
cannot give our assent to such argument. First, Inspector
Edgardo Lenizo,[18]
a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse match
those of Marijoy.[19]
(Correction, Mr.
Justices of the Supreme Court, .......testified that the fingerprint, not
fingerprints. It was based only one single right hand thumbprint of the body.
However, if only they read the Bailen report, the fingerprint-expert in Bailen's
team, P/Lt. Col. Reynaldo Marcelo (Ret.), did not agree with the findings of
Lenizo and itemized many discrepancies in Lenizo's findings.)
Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were
the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being
detained.[20]
Third, the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was
abducted.[21]
And fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the
corpse to be that of Marijoy[22]
which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers
at the ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact,
at this very moment, appellants still fail to
bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the said
body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other
families who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have
surfaced and claimed the body. The above circumstances only
bolster Rusia’s narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep
ravine, following Josman’s instruction "to get rid" of her.
(Who testified to that effect. It was only Mrs. Chiong among all the members of
the Chiong family who testified about that body in court. But then she
admitted she never saw the body of the girl. Contrary to earlier
newspaper reports, she only said that some of
the members of her family told her that that was Marijoy. Isn't that pure hearsay?
The prosecution should have made the ones who
identified the body to testify first hand in court.
I
don't believe it is for the defense to look for the family of that lady found
in the ravine. That is strictly a police matter.
Besides an exhumation would
have solve all doubts about the identity of the body. While in the U.S.A. many
convicted persons are being released after years in prison thanks to DNA
testing. But, here in the Philippines, we had a chance at the early stage of the trial,
but Judge Ocampo denied this because he had always said that he is not
interested for a corpus delicti. Every time the defense would try to question
the identity of the dead lady in court, Judge Ocampo will always object saying
"immaterial and irrelevant". It is ironic, after the defense lawyers
were not allowed to prove that the dead lady found in the ravine was not
Marijoy, now comes the Supreme Court saying it is.
Even Judge
Ocampo in his omnibus order ,
who tried the case expressed his deep doubts that the body was Marijoy's
. What baffles me, is why didn't the Supreme Court commented on these
serious doubts of Judge Ocampo. In both in their earlier decision and in
this latest decision, they are completely silent about Judge Ocampo's concern
about the identity of the body and the charge that the police hid some
evidences from the court. Could this omnibus order not have been
included in the files forwarded to the Supreme Court in Manila from the Regional Trial
Court?
In
the same omnibus order, Judge Ocampo explains further that Rusia could have lied
about
pushing Marijoy down the ravine.
On
the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only
seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the
crimes were committed, the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James
Andrew’s birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of the Formal
Offer of Additional Evidence,[23] with the statement
that he was eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999,
appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum
correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by alleging that
James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.[24]
Now,
James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the
proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays
that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
The entry
of James Andrew’s birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is
extremely difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim.
However, considering that minority is a significant factor in the imposition
of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a)
to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the
National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrew’s Birth
Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on
the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy,
solely on James Andrews’ claim of minority.
Insofar
as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there
being nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.
In
resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of
evaluating every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court
in response to appellants’ plea for the reversal of their conviction.
But, even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is
an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their
submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our
affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants’ clear
culpability which demands retribution.
WHEREFORE,
the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED.
The Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local
Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a
clear and legible copy of James Andrew’s Birth Certificate, and (b)
within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the
motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely
on James Andrews’ claim of minority. The motion is likewise DENIED
insofar as James Anthony Uy
is concerned.
SO
ORDERED.