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PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. Nos. 138874-75 - versus - Present:
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: For most Cebuanos, the proceedings in these cases will always be remembered as the "trial of the century." A reading of the voluminous records readily explains why the unraveling of Page 2 These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a college beauty queen along with her comely and courageous sister. An intriguing tale of ribaldry and gang-rape was followed by the murder of the beauty queen. She was thrown off a cliff into a deep forested ravine where she was left to die. Her sister was subjected to heartless indignities before she was also gang-raped in the aftermath of the kidnapping and rape, the sister was made to disappear. Where she is and what further crimes were inflicted upon her remain unknown and unsolved up to the present.
Before us in an appeal from the Decision1
dated May 5,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu
Page 3 The Fourth Amended
Informations2 for kidnapping and illegal detention dated
May 12, 1998 filed against appellants and Davidson Rusia alias
"Tisoy Tagalog," the discharged state witness,
1) For Criminal
Case No. CBU‑45303:3
"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00
o'clock more or less in the evening, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, all private individuals, conniving, confederating and
mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intent, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive one Marijoy
Chiong, of her liberty and on the occasion thereof,
and in connection,
accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have carnal knowledge
of said Marijoy against her will with the Page
4
"CONTRARY
TO LAW." 2)
For Criminal Case CBU-45304:4 "That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock more or less in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all private individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive one Jacqueline Chiong of her liberty, thereby detaining her until the present.
PAGE
5
The version of the prosecution is narrated as follows: PAGE
6
Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18, 1997, a certain Rudy Lasaga reported
to the police that a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff in
Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu.10 Officer-in Charge Arturo
Unabia and three other policemen proceeded to Tan-awan and there, they
found a dead woman lying on the ground. Attached to her left wrist was a
handcuff.11 Her pants were torn, her orange t-shirt was
raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck
were covered with masking tape.12
On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead woman, Mrs.
Chiong's son Dennis and other relatives proceeded to the Tupaz Funeral
Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see the body. It was Marijoy dressed in the same
orange shirt and maong (denim) pants she wore when she left home on July 16, 1997.
Upon learning of the tragic reality, Mrs. Chiong became frantic and
hysterical. She (NOTE: For our foreign readers, blue wordings, our translations from English to Tagalog (Philippine language) ....the webmaster) PAGE
7
On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the crimes
were committed and identified all the appellants as the perpetrators. He
declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan Larrañaga was Rowen Adlawan
whom he met together with brothers James Anthony and James Andrew Uy five
months before the commission of the crimes charged.17 He
has known Josman Aznar since 1991. He met Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag
only in the evening of July 16,1997.
On July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu
Plaza I
Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen approached him and PAGE
8
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met Rusia at
the back
exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to ride with them in a white
car. Rusia
noticed that a red car was following them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes
Avenue, same city, he saw two women standing at the waiting shed.20
Rusia did not know yet that their names were Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he and Rowen
approached and invited Marijoy and Jacqueline to join them.21
But the sisters declined. Irked by the rejection, Rowen grabbed Marijoy
while Josman held Jacqueline and forced both girls to ride in the car.22
Marijoy was the first one PAGE
9
Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline managed to get out
of the car. Josman chased her and brought her back into the car. Not
taking anymore chances, Rowen elbowed Jacqueline on the chest and punched
Marijoy on the stomach, causing both girls to faint.23
Rowen asked Rusia for the packaging tape under the latter's seat and
placed it on the girls' mouths. Rowen also handcuffed them jointly. The
white and red cars then proceeded to Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City.
At Fuente Osmeña, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug Store and
urged Rusia to inquire if a van that was parked nearby was for hire.
A man who was around replied "no" so the group
immediately left. The two cars stopped again near Park Place Hotel where
Rusia negotiated to hire a van. But no van was available. Thus, the cars
sped to a house in Guadalupe, Cebu City known as the safehouse of the "Jozman
Aznar Group." Thereupon, Larrañaga, James Anthony and James
Andrew got out of the red car. PAGE
10
Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to the white
car. Then the, two cars headed to the South Bus Terminal where they were
able to hire a white van driven by Alberto. Ariel was the conductor. James
Andrew drove the white car, while the rest of the group boarded the van.
They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South
Bus Terminal. Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining strength. James Anthony taped their mouths anew and Rowen handcuffed them together. Along the way, the van and the white car stopped by a barbeque store. Rowen got off the van and bought barbeque and Tanduay rhum. They proceeded to Tan- PAGE
11
Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman brought
Jacqueline inside the vehicle. Josman came out from the van after ten
minutes, saying, "whoever wants
next go ahead and hurry
up." Rusia went inside the van and raped Jacqueline, followed by
James Andrew. At this instance, Marijoy was to breathe her last for upon
Josman's instruction, Rowen and Ariel led her to the cliff and mercilessly
pushed her into the ravine27, which was almost 150 meters
deep.28 PAGE
12
There were other people, who saw snippets of what Rusia had witnessed.
Sheila Singson,30 Analie Konahap31 and
Williard Redobles32 testified that Marijoy and Jacqueline
were talking to Larrañaga and Josman before they were abducted. Roland
Dacillo33 saw Jacqueline alighting and running away from a
white car and that Josman went after her and grabbed her back to the car.
Alfredo Duarte34 testified that he was at the barbeque
stand when Rowen bought barbeque; that Rowen asked where he could buy
Tanduay; that he saw a white van and he heard therefrom voices of a male and
female who seemed to be PAGE
13
Still, there were other witnesses38
presented by the
prosecution who gave details which, when pieced together, corroborated well
Rusia's testimony on what transpired at the Ayala Center all the way to
Carcar. PAGE
14
PAGE
15
Meanwhile, James Anthony Uy testified that on July 16, 1997, he and his
brother James Andrew were at home in Cebu City because it was their'
father's 50th birthday and they were celebrating the
occasion with a small party which ended at 11:30 in the evening.53
He only left his house the next day, July 17, (NOTE: For our foreign readers, blue wordings, our translations from English to Tagalog (Philippine language) ....the webmaster). PAGE
16
Clotilde Soterol testified for Alberto and Ariel. She narrated that on
July 16, 1997, at around 7:00 o'clock
in the evening, Alberto brought the white Toyota van with Plate No. GGC-491
to her shop to have its aircon repaired. Alberto was accompanied by his
wife Gina Caño, co-appellant Ariel, and spouses Catalina and Simplicio
Paghinayan, owners of the vehicle. Since her (Clotildes') husband was not
yet around, Alberto just left the vehicle and promised to return the next
morning. Her husband arrived at 8:30 in the evening and started to repair
the aircon at 9:00 o'clock of the same evening. He finished the work* at
10:00 O'clock the following morning. At 11:00 o'clock, Alberto and his
wife Gina, Ariel and Catalina returned to the shop PAGE
17
To lend support to Josman's alibi, Michael Dizon recounted that on
July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he and several friends
were at Josman's house in Cebu. They ate their dinner there and afterwards
drank "Blue Label." They
stayed at Josman's house until 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Thereafter,
they proceeded to BAI Disco where they drank beer and socialized with old
friends. They stayed there until 1:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997.
Thereafter, they transferred to DTM Bar. They went home together at about
3:00 o'clock in the morning. Their friend, Jonas Dy Pico, dropped Josman at
his house.60
Concerning state witness Rusia, on August 7, 1998, when the prosecution
moved that he be discharged as an accused for the purpose of utilizing him
as a state witness,61
Larrañaga and brothers James
Anthony and James Andrew opposed the motion PAGE
18 Resenting
the trial court's termination of Rusia's cross-examination, the defense
lawyers moved for the inhibition of Judge
Ocampo.67
When he informed the defense lawyers that he would. not inhibit himself
since he found no "just and valid reasons" therefore, the defense
lawyers withdrew en masse as
counsel for the appellants declaring that they would no longer attend the
trial. Judge Ocampo held them guilty of direct PAGE
19
In the Order dated August 25, 1998, the trial court denied the motion for
inhibition of the defense lawyers and ordered them to continue representing
their respective clients so that the cases may undergo the mandatory
continuous trial. The trial court likewise denied their motion to withdraw
as appellants' counsel because of their failure to secure a prior written
consent from their clients, On August 26, 1998, appellants, filed their
written consent to the withdrawal of their counsel.
Thereafter, Larrañaga, Josman and brothers James Anthony and James Andrew
moved for the postponement of the hearing for several weeks to enable them
to hire the services of new counsel.68
On
August 31, 1998, the trial court denied appellants' motions on the ground
that it could no longer delay the hearing of the cases. On September 2,
1998, the trial court directed the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to act as
counsel de oficio
for all the appellants.69 PAGE
20
Thereafter, or on October 1, 1998, the defense lawyers started cross-examining
Rusia. The cross-examination continued on October 5, 6, 12 and 13, 1998. Eventually, acting on the prosecution's motion to discharge Rusia to be a .state witness, the trial court required the opposing parties to submit their respective memoranda. On November 12, 1998, the trial court issued an omnibus order granting the prosecution's motion discharging Rusia as an accused and according him the status of a state witness. PAGE
21
"WHEREFORE,
all
the accused Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, James Andrew Uy, James
Anthony Uy, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, and Ariel Balansag are hereby
found Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and are
hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua (life
sentences) each - which penalties, however, may be
served by them simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal Code).
Further, said accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the two
(2) victims in these cases, jointly and severally, in the amount of
P200,000.00 in actual damages and R5,000,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages. "SO ORDERED." "I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNTRUSTWORTHY, INCONSISTENT, CONTRADICTORY AND. INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY OF (DAVIDSON) VALIENTE RUSIA. "II THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TE8TIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DULY REPRESENTED BY COUNSELS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE DURING THE TIME THESE WITNESSES WERE PRESENTED. "III THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR. (NOTE: For our foreign readers, blue wordings, our translations from English to Tagalog (Philippine language) ....the webmaster) PAGE 22 "IV THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. "V THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISPLAYING MANIFEST ANIMOSITY TOWARDS THE DEFENSE'S WITNESSES WHICH CLEARLY SHOWED ITS PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN DECIDING THE CASE. "VI THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING SOME DEFENSE WITNESSES TO TESTIFY. "VII THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING ROWEN ADLAWAN TO HAVE WAIVED PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF." "I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCHARGING DAVID VALIENTE RUSIA AS STATE WITNESS IN GROSS AND BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE RULES ON DISCHARGE OF STATE WITNESS. "II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING THAT HIS CRIMINAL RECORD - AS AN EX-CONVICT, DRUG ADDICT AND GANGSTER - AND HIS SUICIDAL TENDENCIES - SERIOUSLY IMPAIR HIS CREDIBILITY AND INNATE CAPACITY FOR TRUTH, HONESTY AND INTEGRITY. PAGE 23 "III THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY REPLETE AS IT WAS WITH INCONSISTENCIES, FALSEHOODS AND LIES. "IV THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. "V THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT AZNAR HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND IN DEPRIVING HIM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED AZNAR'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE REFUSED TO INHIBIT HIMSELF AND PROCEEDED WITH THE. TRIAL DESPITE GLARING BADGES OF HIS PARTIALITY AND BIAS FOR THE PROSECUTION. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCREDITING AND DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT AZNAR ON THE BASIS OF PROSECUTING EVIDENCE MAINLY ANCHORED ON RUSIA'S TESTIMONY WHICH FAILED TO EVINCE PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF APPELLANT AZNAR'S CRIMINAL LIABILITY." In his 145-page appellant's brief, Larrañaga alleges that the trial court committed the following errors: "6.1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING AND VIOLATING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. PAGE 24 6.2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DAVIDSON RUSIA. 6.3 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING PARTIAL CREDIBILITY TO THE TESTIMONY OF DAVIDSON RUSIA. 6.4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER WITNESSES. 6.5 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF OTHER WITNESSES. 6.6 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. 6.7 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING AND REJECTING, EVEN AT DIRECT TESTIMONY STAGE, THE ACCUSED‑APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI." "A) THE TRIAL COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY FAILED TO OBSERVE, AND THUS DENIED ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, TO HAVE COUNSEL OF. THEIR OWN CHOICE, TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE, TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE, AND TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE ON THEIR BEHALF; B) THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY IN THESE CASES THUS THE TRIAL COURT BELOW SERIOUSLY AND PAGE 25 GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED THE 5 MAY 1999 JUDGMENT OF CONVICT*ION AGAINST THEM."70 Appellants' assignments of error converge on four points, thus: (1) violation of their right to' due process; (2) the improper discharge of Rusia as, an accused to be a state witness; (3) the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution; and (4) the. trial court's disregard and rejection of the evidence for the defense. The appeal is bereft of merit.
Due
process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual
freedoms; it is
the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the
rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the State may
exercise.71
In evaluating a due process claim, the court must determine whether life,
liberty or property interest exists, and if so, what procedures, are
constitutionally required to protect that right,72
Otherwise
stated, the due process clause calls for two separate inquiries in
evaluating an alleged violation: did
the plaintiff lose PAGE
26 For our determination, therefore, is whether the minimum requirements of due process were accorded to appellants during the trial of these cases. Section 14, Article III of our Constitution catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal prosecution, thus: "SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." Rule 115 of the Revised' Rules of Criminal Procedure casts the foregoing provision in a more detailed manner, thus:
"SECTION
1. Rights
of accused at the trial.
- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights: PAGE
27 (b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c)
To be present and defend in person and by counsel
at every stage of the (d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct, examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. (g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf. (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. (i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law." PAGE
28 A. Right to Counsel Anent the right to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first, for appointing counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be assisted by counsel of their own choice; and second, for refusing to suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new counsel.
Appellants
cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We have held that there is
no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de
parte,
pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system.74 PAGE
29
At
any rate, the appointment of counsel de
oficio under such circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution.
An examination of its provisions concerning the right to counsel shows
that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more
aptly and specifically to a person under investigation75
rather than an accused, in a criminal prosecution.76
And even if we are to extend the application of the concept of
"preference in the choice PAGE
30 Withal the word 'preferably' under Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusively as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.77
In the same breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal
prosecution is not a plenary one. If
the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded
from appointing a de oficio
counsel whom it considers competent and independent to enable the trial
to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise,
the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the
accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.78 PAGE
31
In
the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or three (3)
weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods are unreasonable. Appellants'
could have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to. They
should have been diligent in procuring new counsel.81
Constitutional
guaranty of right to representation by counsel does not mean that accused
may avoid trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel
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